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chapter nine
WHIP SCARS ON THE NAKED SOUL:
MYTH AND ELENCHOS IN PLATO’S GORGIAS
Radcliffe G. Edmonds III
Stripped of his regal robes and all the trappings of his worldly power, the
soul of the Great King cowers naked before Rhadamanthys, who looks down
upon the crippled wretch before him, disfigured like the basest slave by the
marks of the whip and covered with festering sores. Many scholars have
interpreted this horrific image of the judgement of the soul from Plato’s
Gorgias as a threat of hell-fire designed to convince the skeptical Callicles
that justice pays ‘in the end’. The myth at the end of the Gorgias has thus
been seen as a failure of Plato’s philosophy, one of those places which, in
Zeller’s condescending words, ‘indicate the point at which it becomes evi-
dent that as yet [Plato] cannot be wholly a philosopher, because he is too
much a poet’.1 Scholars have been critical of what they see as an attempt
by Plato to beg the premises of his argument for the philosophic life by
appealing to the idea that justice always pays off ‘in the end’ because of
some system of compensation in the hereafter. Even Annas, whose treat-
ment of Plato’s myths of judgement is among the most sensitive, sees the
myth in the Gorgias as asserting a necessary premise without proof: ‘The
Gorgias myth is both the most religiously coloured and the starkest in
the claim it makes that justice pays in the end …. In the Gorgias, Plato
insists flatly that justice will bring rewards in the end, though without giv-
ing us any good reason to believe this’.2 Without the moral optimism that
1 Zeller (1888), 163. This idea that the myths betray the limits of Plato’s philosophic ability
goes back to Hegel.
2 Annas (1982), 125, 138, here 125: ‘The myth, then, is giving a consequentialist reason
to be just. Whether we take it as really threatening future punishment for wrongdoing, or
demythologize its message as the claim that being wicked brings the punishment of a scarred
and deformed soul now, its message is still that justice pays ‘in the end,’ on a deeper level than
we can now see’. I would point out, however, the crucial difference between ‘in the end’ and
‘on a deeper level’ of reality.
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justice will prevail in the end, she asks, how could one not be as unconvinced
as Callicles by these old wives’ tales?3
I argue, to the contrary, that the details of the myth help clarify the ways
in which Plato tries to prove that Socrates’ way of life really is better than
Callicles’, not just ‘in the end,’ after the afterlife judgement, but right now,
at any given moment. Specifically, I suggest that a proper understanding of
the myth helps resolve another of the recurring problems in Platonic schol-
arship, the nature of the Socratic elenchos. Plato carefully manipulates the
traditional mythic details in his tale of an afterlife judgement to provide
an illustration, in vivid and graphic terms, of the workings of the Socratic
elenchos. Not only does myth of the reform of the afterlife judgement illus-
trate through narrative the contrasts between Socrates’ elenchos and the
rhetorical arguments of his interlocutors, but the description of the judge-
ment and punishment as the examination and healing of a soul scarred with
wounds and disease illuminates the effects of the elenchos on the interlocu-
tors. The image of the Great King’s scarred and misshapen soul, stripped of
all its coverings and supports and examined by the expert in justice, illus-
trates the way Socrates puts his interlocutors to the test, while the afterlife
punishments prescribed for the wrong-doers depict the suffering that the
shame of the elenchos inflicts. Moreover, Plato manipulates the traditional
mythic punishment of the water carriers to depict the life of those who fail
to be cured by the therapeutic punishment of the elenchos. The myth does
not supplement a deficient argument for the philosophic life; rather, Plato
makes use of the narrative and the traditional aspects of the myth to depict
the examination of the unexamined life in the here and now.
1. The Elenchos
The ‘Socratic elenchos’ is a term used in the scholarship for the method
of argumentation that Socrates employs in all of the so-called ‘early’ dia-
logues, a process of question and answer by which Socrates shows his
interlocutor that his statements involve an inconsistency.4 While in other
3 Cf. Saunders (1991), 205, ‘Socrates’ interlocutors, who are commonly sceptical of the
need to cultivate the soul and to adhere to just conduct at any price, are confronted with
edifying and powerful stories designed to appeal to their feelings and imagination, even if
argument has failed to convince their intellect’.
4 Vlastos (1983), 39, translates the procedure into the propositional logic of modern
philosophers, although Brickhouse and Smith (1991), 135 ff., have emphasized that Socrates
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dialogues Socrates employs his elenchos without much comment on its form
or method, in the Gorgias the elenchos is not only employed, but discussed
by the interlocutors.5 The verb Socrates uses to describe this process of refu-
tation or cross-examination is elenchein, which derives from the Homeric
to elenchos, meaning shame or disgrace.6 The implicit competition in this
form of argument has been stressed in recent scholarship; the elenchos is
a contest of speech between two parties—to win is to put your opponent
to shame (elenchein), to lose is to be humiliated (elenchesthai).7 Like any
of the contests which were central to the Greek way of life, however, the
elenchos must be played by the rules, and, in the Gorgias, Socrates care-
fully specifies the rules for his kind of elenchos, rules that differ in signifi-
cant ways from the refutations practiced in the law courts and the assem-
blies. The basic process of refutation, pointing out a contradiction between
accepted premises and consequences that follow from them, is not much
is testing not so much propositions as ways of life, cf. La. 187e6–188a2; Ap. 39c7. See also
the critique of Vlastos’ elenchos in Talisse (2002). Whether the so-called ‘early’ dialogues
(Vlastos’ list is Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major and
Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Protagoras, and the first book of the Republic) were in
fact written earlier than Plato’s other dialogues is irrelevant for my purposes. They may be
conveniently grouped together because they exhibit a number of common characteristics,
one of which is the prominent use of the elenchos.
5 Brickhouse and Smith (1991), in their examination of Socrates’ use of the elenchos, draw
together from other dialogues many of Socrates’ comments on the way the elenchos should
be conducted, but the Gorgias is the only dialogue in which Socrates explicitly compares
types of refutations.
6 The Attic ὁ ἔλεγχος is generally used in the specific sense of a legal or rhetorical
refutation, in contrast to the broader epic sense of shame, but the sense of failing a test
or contest always underlies this refutation. To lose a contest or to fail a test, particularly
in a public arena such as a lawcourt or even a street corner in front of a crowd, inevitably
produces shame for the loser. While in other dialogues, the elenchos can become a friendly
game played between friends, where the element of shame is minimized, in the Gorgias, the
game is less friendly and the shame element is more prominent.
7 See especially Lesher (2002), who traces the use of the word from its Homeric uses to
its philosophic uses in Parmenides and up to Plato, Ausland (2002), who emphasizes the
forensic context for the elenchos, and Dorion (1990), who emphasizes the agonistic nature
of the elenchos and shows the ways in which Plato builds upon contemporary forensic
procedure to create his own type of philosophic elenchos. Cf. Tarrant (2002), 68: ‘The Greek
verb was still correctly understood as involving the exposure of an opponent. In forensic
speeches, where it was extremely common, it might involve the exposure of the faults (and
hence the guilt) of the defendant, or the accuracy (and hence the reliability) of a witness. It
was never a friendly process’. See ibid., n. 3: ‘I count 181 uses of elenchos terminology in the
speeches attributed to Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isaeus, and Isocrates’. Adkins (1960),
30–60 rightly points to the connections between shame and failure to succeed at heroic
action.
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different when employed by Socrates from the process employed by eristic
opponents like Dionysiodorus or indeed by opponents in the law courts.8
Plato nevertheless has Socrates insist on differences in his mode of elenchos,
and he further amplifies and illustrates those differences with the myth at
the end of the dialogue.
2. Judicial Reform
In the Gorgias, Plato plays off his contemporaries’ understanding of the way
a normal Athenian legal contest worked to level a critique at the judicial
system that condemned his teacher to death, contrasting the contest of lit-
igation with his ideal of philosophic examination. Success in the Athenian
lawcourts, it must be remembered, did not depend on fingerprints, blood-
stains, and DNA evidence. Rather, the trial was a contest between two oppo-
nents, both of whom were subject to the scrutiny and judgement of the huge
panel of dikasts. In the absence of high standards for material evidence, the
dikasts’ decision had to be made largely on the grounds of the character
of the accuser and accused. A fragment of Euripides’ Phoenix expresses the
idea nicely: ‘I’ve already been chosen to judge many disputes and have heard
witnesses competing against each other with opposing accounts of the same
event. And like any wise man I work out the truth by looking at a man’s
nature and the life he leads’.9 Accordingly, both sides tried to present them-
selves in the most positive light, appealing to the standards and prejudices
of the dikasts. Much of the preparation for an effective law court speech con-
sisted in the creation of a portrait of the speaker that would appeal to the
dikasts. In the courts, the witnesses served to establish the litigant’s status
in Athenian society and to affirm his good reputation within the networks
8 As Tulin (2005), 304 comments, ‘admittedly, Plato never tired of distinguishing his
dialectic from the petty, logic-chopping sophistic which he terms eristic, antilogic, and the
like: his seeks truth, theirs seeks only victory, doxa, and appearance. But, this said, the fact
remains that there is no formal difference between the two, and that Plato retains (from first
to last) a lively interest in the gymnastic, or purely logical aspect of the elenchus—developing
by example many of the finer points of logic which Aristotle would later formalize as precept’.
Cf. Ausland (2002), who compares the usage of the elenchos in forensic contexts and Platonic
dialogues. Dorion (1990) argues that Plato draws on the ἐρώτησις procedure of the law courts
in manipulating the elenchos.
9 ἤδη δὲ piο ῶν λόγων κριτὴς καὶ piό ’ ἁµι ηθέντα µαρτύρων ὕpiο τἀναντί’ ἔγνων συµφορᾶς
µιᾶς piέρι. κἀγὼ µὲν οὕτω χὥστις ἔστ’ ἀνὴρ σοφὸς λογίζοµαι τἀληθές, εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν σκοpiῶν
δίαιτάν θ’ ἥντιν’ ἡµερευται (fr. 812 Nauck—from Aeschines, C. Timarch. 152). See Humphreys
(1985), 313–369, esp. 322 ff.
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of family and local units of which he was a part, thus supplementing the
positive self-presentation in his speeches.10
In the myth, this normal Athenian system of justice is in place before the
reign of Zeus over the cosmos: the one about to die appears before a large
mass of dikasts to defend the conduct of his life, and he sways his judges
with his displays of character and status, bolstered not only by his trappings
of wealth and power but by the witness of his friends.
For now the cases are judged badly. For those being judged (he said) are
judged with clothes on; for they are judged while they’re still alive. And so
many (he said) with base souls are covered in fine bodies and noble birth and
riches; and when their judgement comes, many witnesses come to support
them and to testify that they have lived justly. And so the judges are impressed
by all this; and at the same time they judge with clothes on, obstructed by eyes
and ears and their whole body in front of their soul. All these things, then, are
in their way, both their own coverings and the defendants.11
(Gorg. 523c2–d5)
To remedy the injustices this system produced, however, Zeus reforms the
whole system of judgement. Not only will mortals be judged after death by
other dead people, but they will be stripped of the foreknowledge of death,
leaving them no time to prepare an elaborate defence. Moreover, they will
be stripped at death not only of their bodies, but also of all their marks of
status in life, all of the clothes and riches and supporting witnesses. The
naked soul alone will face judgement, and not by a mass of ignorant citizens,
but by a single expert judge: one of the sons of Zeus famed for his wisdom—
Rhadamanthys, Aiakos, or Minos (Gorg. 523a1–524b1).12
10 As scholars such as Todd and Humphreys stress, the primary function of a witness in the
Athenian court was not, as in the modern courtroom, to present impartial factual evidence,
but rather to support the status of the speaker. Witnesses represented, in Humphreys’ terms,
‘the social networks in which litigants were personally known. The support and good opinion
of such social networks was very important for the litigant’ (Humphreys [1985], 350). See
Todd (1990), 23: ‘Traditional interpretation of the Athenian law of evidence rests on the
unstated assumption that Athenian witness had the same primary function as a modern
witness: to tell the truth. But it is clear even on a cursory examination that Athenians did
not use witnesses in the way that we do’.
11 νῦν µὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀµpiεχόµενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόµενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες
γὰρ κρίνονται. piο οὶ οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ψυχὰς piονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠµφιεσµένοι εἰσὶ σώµατά τε καλὰ καὶ
γένη καὶ piλούτους, καί, ἐpiειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς piο οὶ µάρτυρες, µαρτυρήσοντες ὡς
δικαίως βεβιώκασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑpiό τε τούτων ἐκpiλήττονται, καὶ ἅµα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀµpiεχόµενοι
δικάζουσι,piρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὑτῶν ὀφθαλµοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶµα piροκεκαλυµµένοι. ταῦτα
δὴ αὐτοῖς piάντα ἐpiίpiροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀµφιέσµατα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινοµένων.
12 Citations from the Gorgias are from the text of Dodds (1959); I take all the translations
of the Gorgias from Irwin (1979).
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The reforms of the judicial process that Zeus imposes in the myth corre-
spond to the differences that Socrates points out between his elenchos and
the lawcourt rhetoric of his interlocutors, particularly that of the impetu-
ous Polus. Just as souls under the new regime cannot prepare an elabo-
rate defence speech, so Socrates repeatedly prohibits his interlocutors from
making the long, oratorical speeches that would be appropriate in a law-
court, requiring them to submit to the examination of the elenchos (Gorg.
449b48).13
Calling witnesses as if in an Athenian court is another mark of the rhetor-
ical style of Polus’ refutation which Socrates rejects. When Socrates refuses
to agree with him, Polus appeals to the crowd to support him. ‘Don’t you
think you are thoroughly refuted, Socrates, when you say things like this,
that not a single man would say? For look, ask one of these people here’
(Gorg. 473e4–5).14 Socrates accuses Polus: ‘You’re trying to refute me rhetor-
ically, like those who think they’re refuting people in the jury-courts’ (471e2–
3).15
Socrates, by contrast, claims that his elenchos produces the one crucial
witness worth more than any number of other witnesses, the interlocutor
himself. ‘For I know how to produce just one witness to whatever I say—
the man I am having a discussion with whoever he may be—but I forget
about the many. I know how to put the question to a vote to one man,
13 ῏Αρ’ οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσpiερ νῦν διαλεγόµεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ µὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ’
ἀpiοκρινόµενος, τὸ δὲ µῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀpiοθέσθαι; ἀ ’
ὅpiερ ὑpiισχνῇ, µὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀ ὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώµενον ἀpiοκρίνεσθαι. ‘Then would
you be willing, Gorgias, to continue this present way of discussion, by alternate question and
answer, and defer to some other time that lengthy style of speech in which Polus made a
beginning? Come, be true to your promise, and consent to answer each question briefly’. See
also 462a1–4: ἀ ’ εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρηµένου καὶ ἐpiανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσpiερ
νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀνθέµενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ µέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώµενος, ὥσpiερ ἐγώ τε καὶ
Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. ‘No, if you have any concern for the argument that we have
carried on, and care to set it on its feet again, revoke whatever you please, as I suggested
just now; take your turn in questioning and being questioned, like me and Gorgias; and thus
either refute or be refuted’.
14 Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώpiων; ἐpiεὶ
ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί. Socrates characterizes this law court refutation as ‘worth nothing towards
the truth. For sometimes someone may actually be beaten by many false witnesses thought to
amount to something’. 471e7–472a2: οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν piρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν·
ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδοµαρτυρηθείη τις ὑpiὸ piο ῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι (Plato, unlike
the Lord Chancellor in Iolanthe, tends to ‘assume that the witnesses summoned in force,|
in Exchequer, Queen’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Divorce,| have perjured themselves as a
matter of course …’).
15 ῥητορικῶς γάρ µε ἐpiιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσpiερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούµενοι ἐλέγχειν. See
Dorion (1990), 323–327, on the use of witnesses in the courts and Plato’s critique.
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but don’t even have a dialogue with the many’ (474a5–b1).16 Socrates rejects
the ‘wisdom of the masses,’ preferring to settle the question with a dialogic
interchange between two individuals.17
Plato crafts his description of the reformed afterlife judgement to resem-
ble the Socratic elenchos, tailoring the traditional mythic motifs to fit with
the process. Like the Socratic elenchos, the afterlife judgement in Zeus’
regime takes place between two individuals, an examiner and an examined.
In both, the examined is the only admissible witness, and that one witness
is sufficient for a judgement, even superior to a crowd of false witnesses—
the body, the clothes, the friends and relatives of the deceased—who could
obstruct the examiner in his inquiry.18 The striking image of the naked soul,
unprepared and trembling before the expert judge, depicts the interlocu-
tor whose beliefs are being examined in the elenchos, bereft of appeals to
popular opinion or the authority of his social status, and the chronological
structure of the narrative in the myth highlights the logical contrast between
types of refutations.
3. Medical Metaphors
Rather than the afterlife judge acting as a surrogate punisher for the wrongs
committed against others, as the limited evidence for earlier myths of
the afterlife suggests, in the Gorgias myth, the judge uses his expertise to
16 ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα µὲν piαρασχέσθαι µάρτυρα ἐpiίσταµαι, αὐτὸν piρὸς ὃν ἄν µοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ,
τοὺς δὲ piο οὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐpiιψηφίζειν ἐpiίσταµαι, τοῖς δὲ piο οῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγοµαι. After
Socrates has made Polus concede that neither he nor anyone else could prefer to do injustice
rather than suffer it, he once again draws the contrast between their two styles of elenchos.
‘You see, then, Polus, that when this refutation is compared with that one it is not at all like
it. You have everyone else agreeing with you except me, but I am quite satisfied with you just
by yourself, agreeing and being my witness. I put the question for a vote to you alone, and let
all the others go’. 475e7–476a2: ῾Ορᾷς οὖν,ὦΠῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος piαρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον piαραβα όµενος
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀ ὰ σοὶ µὲν οἱ ἄ οι piάντες ὁµολογοῦσιν piλὴν ἐµοῦ, ἐµοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν
µόνος καὶ ὁµολογῶν καὶ µαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ µόνον ἐpiιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄ ους ἐῶ χαίρειν.
17 Cf. Socrates’ rejections of the common opinion in Laches, 184e and Crito, 46d–47d (a
contrast to Xenophon’s depiction of Socratic argument starting from common opinion in
Memorabilia, 4.6.15). Moreover, if indeed Socrates’ mention of his service on the Council is
meant to recall the illegal trial of the Generals after Arginusae, Plato is attacking not just the
idea of having a mass of dikasts, but also the idea of trying a group of defendants en masse.
Another layer of imagery that may be in play is the idea of the private arbitration that could
often substitute for the public trial, in which a single arbitrator (chosen by both parties out of
respect for his fairness and insight) would render a judgement instead of the mass of dikasts.
18 The examiner too relies not on the bodily senses that perceive these superficial attri-
butes, but on the faculties of his soul.
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evaluate the soul by the wrongs it has done to itself, the harm caused to the
soul by its way of life, and then, like a doctor, to prescribe the appropriate
corrective treatment.
3.1. Diagnosis
In the myth, the deceased mortal, stripped of body and marks of mortal
status, faces the judge with a naked soul. Just as presenting a good appear-
ance through one’s rhetoric and witnesses is the key to winning in an Athe-
nian court, so too in the afterlife the primary criterion on which Aiakos or
Rhadamanthys evaluates the deceased is the appearance of his soul.
But what, for Plato, is a good-looking soul? Plato employs very physical
terms to describe the soul in this dialogue, and a good-looking soul is
described in terms appropriate to a good-looking body. A soul must present
an appearance worthy of a free citizen, well developed from exercise in
the gymnasium and without the whip scars that mark the disobedient
slave or the festering sores that indicate poor health.19 The soul coming
to judgement bears only the marks of the conditioning of its soul, which
are exposed to the expert knowledge of the judge who can diagnose the
disease or deformity of the soul from its appearance and prescribe the fitting
correction.20 The expert examination of the judge in the myth thus serves
19 As so often, especially in an aristocratic context, the aesthetic appearance carries a
moral connotation—καλός is both beautiful and good, whileαἰσχρός is ugly, base, and shame-
ful. Only an appearance that is fine enough qualifies for honoured treatment. However, the
afterlife judgement of naked souls may well also recall the examination of the athletes before
a competition such as the Olympic games, in which the competitors had to strip down and
be examined by judges who, on the basis of the athletes’ physical development, would clas-
sify them as paides or ephebes, cf. Pausanias V, 24.10 (I owe this idea to Betsy Gebhard).
Unfortunately no evidence remains that gives any detailed description of such a process of
judgement before the competition. It may well be that the Gorgias contains more imagery
resonant of this process, but the allusions are lost to the modern reader.
20 Cf. 524c5–d7, where the marks on the soul are compared to marks on the body. The
souls of the dead were frequently imagined as eidola of the deceased—insubstantial, but
essentially like the deceased as he was remembered from life. The deceased was frequently
represented as being like to the living person, but with the wounds that caused his death.
Such an image appears not only in Homer (Odyssey, 9, 40–41), where Odysseus sees ‘many
fighting men killed in battle, stabbed with brazen spears, still carrying their bloody armour on
them,’ but on numerous vases, where the depiction of dead men with bandaged wounds was
a recognized topos. Dodds ad loc (p. 379) points out the tradition of scarred souls following
Plato: Lucian, Cataplus, 24 ff.; Philo, Spec. Leg. i. 103; Plutarch, Ser. num. vind. 22, 564d;
Epictetus 2.18.11; Tacitus, Annals 6.6.; Themistius, Orat. 20, 234a. The wounds that the body
sustained were, moreover, thought to leave their mark on the soul after death, to the extent
that those who feared the retribution of the angry dead might deliberately mutilate the
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the same function as the examination in the elenchos, to determine the
errors in the patient’s way of life. By using Socrates’ myth, Plato presents
in graphic form the contradictions exposed by the Socratic elenchos as
the scars and wounds that mar the soul which is laid bare to Aiakos or
Rhadamanthys.21
3.2. Prescriptions for Corrective Treatment
While Plato uses the tale of Zeus’ reform and the image of the naked soul
to illustrate the contrasts between the rhetoric of the Athenian lawcourts
and the Socratic elenchos, other aspects of the myth depict the effects
of the elenchos itself. The metaphor of the diagnosis and healing of the
soul underlies both the discussions of the elenchos in the dialogue and
the myth at the end, providing a link between the two. The effect of the
elenchos is described in medical terms throughout the dialogue, and the
myth separates the diagnostic and curative functions of the process in its
images of judgement and punishment.
Scholars of ancient philosophy have debated what the Socratic elen-
chos is supposed to achieve in the philosophic arguments of the Platonic
dialogues.22 Many suppose that the elenchos is purely negative, disproving
the false ideas of Socrates’ interlocutors, whereas Vlastos and others have
argued that Plato intended the elenchos to do more, to prove the truth of the
corpse to prevent it from being able to wreak its revenge. The ritual of machalismos, which
Clytemnestra is said by both Aeschylus and Sophocles to have performed on Agamemnon,
involves chopping off the hands of the dead man and stringing them under his armpits,
effectively disarming any attempt he might make at revenge from beyond the grave, cf.
Aeschylus, Choephoroi, 439, Sophocles, Electra, 445. According to the scholiast on Sophocles’
Electra, this gruesome operation was performed to deprive the deceased of the power of
avenging the murder: ἵνα, φασιν, ἀσθενὴς γένοιτο piρὸς ἀντιτίασθαι τὸν φονέα.
21 Nothing in the soul was healthy, but it was thoroughly whip-marked and full of scars
from false oaths and injustice—all that each of his actions stained into the soul—and
everything was crooked from lying and insolence, and nothing straight, from being brought
up without truth; and he saw that from liberty and luxury and excess and incontinence in
actions the soul was full of disproportion and shamefulness. 524e4–525a6: οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἀ ὰ διαµεµαστιγωµένην καὶ οὐλῶν µεστὴν ὑpiὸ ἐpiιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστη ἡ piρᾶξις
αὐτοῦ ἐξωµόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ piάντα σκολιὰ ὑpiὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ
τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑpiὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν piράξεων
ἀσυµµετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέµουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν.
22 For further views on the elenchos, see Vlastos (1983); Kraut (1983); Irwin (1979); Brick-
house and Smith (1984, 1991, and 1997); Kahn (1984 and 1996); May (1997), and Talisse (2002).
Scott (2002) contains a number of essays that treat the elenchos from a variety of perspectives,
mostly using Vlastos (1983) as a starting point.
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opposing positions and thus to teach the interlocutors something.23 I would
argue that the medical metaphor is crucial to understanding the effect of the
elenchos in the Platonic dialogues. Is the elenchos merely diagnostic, point-
ing out the interlocutors’ errors or does it also serve a curative function,
correcting the errors that it has diagnosed? Plato supplements his discus-
sion of the workings of the elenchos in the dialogue with the description
of the afterlife judgement in the myth, and this description of the process
of judgement and punishment of the soul in the afterlife provides a clearer
picture of the effects and limits of the Socratic elenchos.
In developing the medical metaphor of the health of the soul, Plato again
makes use of a contrast between the Socratic elenchos and forensic rhetoric.
The philosophic elenchos, in contrast to the oratory of the rhetoricians
like Polus and Gorgias, is described throughout the dialogue as a kind of
purgative medicine designed to aid the soul in achieving a good condition.
Rhetoric is compared to an elaborate banquet, designed to give pleasure
to the audience.24 Both rhetoric and cookery are part of that practice of
pandering to the pleasures of the audience without regard to its welfare that
Socrates terms ‘flattery’, kolakeia. The elenchos, by contrast, is not merely
a diet, a regimen, but actually bitter medicine, painful and unpleasant to
swallow, unlike the pleasing periods of oratory. Although pain is not the
essential feature of medical treatment, it is an unavoidable result of the
change in state that the treatment effects—a correction or restraint of the
disordered elements, kolasis. If, according to contemporary Greek theories
of medicine, health is a proper balance of elements, and disease is an
improper balance, then any medical treatment must alter the balance of
elements in the body, a process which Plato sees as involving a certain
amount of pain merely through the change.25 Nevertheless, those who do
23 While some scholars, e.g., Vlastos (1983) and Irwin (1979), argue that elenchos is in-
tended to produce a positive result by proving the truth of some proposition, others, e.g.
Benson (1987), claim that the elenchos is intended only to disprove propositions by showing
inconsistency in the interlocutor’s beliefs. Brickhouse and Smith (1991), 135 ff., point out the
the target of the elenchos is more the way of life that follows on the proposition in question, cf.
La. 187e6–188a2; Ap. 39c7. Talisse (2002) argues as well against the idea that the proposition
is the target of the elenchos, although he sees the interlocutor’s knowledge, rather than way
of life, as the target of the attack.
24 Socrates and Chaerophon, arriving too late for Gorgias’ oration, are told that they have
missed a feast (447a). In the elenchos, one must proceed in a moderate fashion, not snatching
and grabbing at clever phrases or unfortunate definitions as though trying to stuff oneself
with the dainties prepared by the chefs (454c).
25 Of course, in Plato’s time almost any medical procedure would have been painful and
unpleasant, more in the manner of dentistry today, which remains uncomfortable despite
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not understand the benefits try to avoid the painful corrections (kolaseis) of
the doctor’s medicine, preferring the pleasant confections (kolakeia) of the
cook.26
3.3. Avoiding Treatment
Plato also applies this medical metaphor in Socrates’ debate with Polus
whether it is better to be punished for injustice or to escape punishment.
Like the child who would avoid the doctor for fear of the painful treatment,
the foolish prefer to escape punishment for injustice. As Socrates remarks:
‘For these people have managed to do about the same thing, my friend, as
if someone suffering from the most serious illnesses, managed not to pay
justice for the faults in his body to the doctors and not to be treated—afraid
like a child of the burning and cutting because it is painful’ (479a5–b1).27
Polus’ hero, the tyrant who can avoid paying for any of his crimes, is reduced
to the little child whimpering with fear at the prospect of a visit to the doctor
that would cure his sickness.
In just this way, Socrates’ interlocutors try to avoid the bitter medicine of
the elenchos. Socrates rebukes both Polus and Callicles for trying to wriggle
out of answering the questions that have trapped them into contradicting
themselves, urging them to take their medicine: ‘Don’t shrink from answer-
ing, Polus—you won’t be harmed at all; but present yourself nobly to the
argument as to a doctor; answer (475d5–7)’.28 Answering in the elenchos is
all the advances in anesthetics and modern technology. In the Laws, Plato explicitly talks
about the pain involved in any kind of shift of mode of life or regimen. ‘Take as an example
the way the body gets used to all sorts of food and drink and exercise. At first they upset it,
but then in the course of time it is this very regimen that is responsible for putting on flesh
…. But imagine someone forced to change again, to one of the other recommended systems:
initially, he’s troubled by illnesses, and only slowly, by getting used to his new way of life, does
he get back to normal’ (La. 797d ff., Saunder’s translation). Saunders (1991), 172 ff., sees this
idea that pain is a necessary component of any change as a new element in the penal theory
of the Laws, stemming from the physiology of the Timaeus, rather than an idea implicit in
contemporary medical ideas that Plato applies to the reform of the soul from injustice as
early as the Gorgias.
26 Cf. again the image of the doctor prosecuted by a cook in front of a jury of children
(521e, 464de).
27 Σχεδὸν γάρ piου οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαpiεpiραγµένοι εἰσὶν ὥσpiερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς µεγίστοις
νοσήµασιν συνισχόµενος διαpiράξαιτο µὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν piερὶ τὸ σῶµα ἁµαρτηµάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς
µηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούµενος ὡσpiερανεὶ piαῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέµνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν.
28 µὴ ὄκνει ἀpiοκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀ ὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσpiερ ἰατρῷ
piαρέχων ἀpiοκρίνου.
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also likened to facing the doctor’s treatment in the argument with Callicles.
The effect of the elenchos is to restrain or temper the one who undergoes
it, to correct the imbalance in his soul and restore it to proper balance and
harmony. Callicles, when he sees that he is about to be put to the shame of
having to deny his thesis, tries to avoid completing the elenchos.
Socrates rebukes him: ‘This man won’t abide being helped and corrected
(kolazomenos), and himself undergoing the very thing our discussion is
about—being corrected’ (505c3–4).29 The treatment of the elenchos cannot
be effective if the patient is able to avoid taking his medicine. Callicles
indeed grumbles that he has only gone along with this argument so far at the
request of Gorgias, who intervened earlier to make Callicles continue the
discussion (497b5). Gorgias’ role in making the patient take his philosophic
medicine recalls his boast at the beginning of the dialogue that he often was
able to persuade patients to take the medicines his brother the doctor was
not able to get them to take (456b). As Socrates warns Callicles, if Callicles
cannot refute the idea that it is better to suffer than to do injustice but
continues to live by that idea, then: ‘Callicles himself will not agree with
you, Callicles, but he will be discordant with you in the whole of your life’
(482b5–6).30 The elenchos, then, is depicted throughout the dialogue as a
kind of purgative medicine that produces a painful effect of kolasis upon the
patient, providing a shock to his system that checks the elements of his soul
that are out of balance, restores the harmony, and makes health possible.31
29 Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑpiοµένει ὠφελούµενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο piάσχων piερὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί,
κολαζόµενος.
30 οὔ σοι ὁµολογήσει Κα ικλῆς, ὦ Κα ίκλεις, ἀ ὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅpiαντι τῷ βίῳ. Callicles is
trapped between his idea that it is better not to suffer anything, even helpful restraint, and
his desire to achieve the best. At the heart of Socrates’ debate with Callicles is the question
of whether it is better to rule or be ruled, to do or to suffer. Callicles’ advocacy of extreme
hedonism in the debate, as well as his political ambitions, stem from the assumption that,
in every case, it is better to do actively than to suffer passively. Socrates’ example of the
kinaidos (494e), is fatal to Callicles’ position, not because it is so disgusting that it makes
even Callicles ashamed, but rather because the kinaidos presents the paradoxical case of one
who actively desires to be passive. Callicles cannot handle such a contradiction of his ideal
and tries to avoid the issue by claiming that such an example is too shameful for mention.
On the kinaidos, see Winkler (1990).
31 Cf. the description in Sophist, 230cd. For just as physicians who care for the body
believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions
are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no
benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who
is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the
teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows,
and no more: νοµίζοντες γάρ, ὦ piαῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσpiερ οἱ piερὶ τὰ σώµατα
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The myth separates, in the chronological order of the narrative, the diag-
nostic and punitive effects of the elenchos. While the exposure of contradic-
tions corresponds to the examination by the judge in the hereafter, the pain
and shame (to elenchos) the interlocutor feels as he loses the argument and
his way of life is turned on its head correspond to the punishments (kola-
seis) the judged soul undergoes.32 In the Gorgias, Plato does not go into a
detailed description of the process of punishment in the underworld for the
one whom the judge condemns (as he does, for example, in the Phaedo); he
merely describes it as undergoing ‘what it is fitting for it to undergo’ (525a7).
This punishment, however, this suffering, produces benefit for the punished
soul, since it is corrected and made better by the treatment prescribed by
the judge. ‘Those who are benefited and pay justice at the hands of gods
and men are those who are at fault with curable faults; but still their bene-
fit comes to them through pain and sufferings both here and in Hades—for
there is no other way to get rid of injustice’ (525b6–c1).33 Plato makes the
punishment of the wrongdoer in the afterlife judgement correspond to the
shaming effect of the elenchos in this life on someone who is defeated in an
argument.34 Like taking the doctor’s medicine, these processes consist of suf-
fering something unpleasant but beneficial. However, their helpful function
does have its limits; only those who submit to treatment can be cured, and
those who, like Callicles, avoid the treatment cannot get the benefits. Such
ἰατροὶ νενοµίκασι µὴ piρότερον ἂν τῆς piροσφεροµένης τροφῆς ἀpiολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶµα,piρὶν ἂν τὰ
ἐµpiοδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ piερὶ ψυχῆς διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, µὴ piρότερον αὐτὴν ἕξειν
τῶν piροσφεροµένων µαθηµάτων [230δ] ὄνησιν, piρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόµενον εἰς αἰσχύνην
καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς µαθήµασιν ἐµpiοδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀpiοφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούµενον
ἅpiερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι µόνα, piλείω δὲ µή. As Renaud (2002), 194–195, comments: ‘according to this
description of the elenchus, then, the soul cannot receive any benefit from knowledge if it is
not first refuted and humbled, indeed brought to shame. … If philosophy begins in wonder,
the elenchus provides the wonder through the aporia, the sufficient proof of one’s ignorance
and of the necessity of learning’.
32 As Callicles protests: ‘If you are in earnest and these things you’re saying are really
true, won’t this human life of ours be turned upside down, and won’t everything we do
evidently be the opposite of what we should do?’ (481c). For discussions of the role of shame
in the dialogue, contrast the arguments of Kahn (1984) with those of McKim (1988), but it
is important to remember that, whatever else Socrates’ interlocutors may or may not feel
shame about, they all feel shame at losing a contest—in contrast to Socrates, who proclaims
that he would rather lose and be corrected than win and be wrong.
33 ὅµως δὲ δι’ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν ῞Αιδου· οὐ γὰρ
οἷόν τε ἄ ως ἀδικίας ἀpiα άττεσθαι.
34 Allen (2000), 60–61, points out the equivalence, between loss in a contest and punish-
ment, ‘punishment, like reward, was the outcome of a contest for honour, but a punishment
was equivalent to a loss in a contest and a loss of honour’. This equivalence would be partic-
ularly felt by an aristocrat such as Callicles, whose life is focused on winning honour.
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unpleasant but beneficial medicine, whether it be the elenchos adminis-
tered by Socrates in the streets of Athens or a judgement rendered by Aiakos
in the underworld, is the only way to cure the erring soul. Those who refuse
the treatment must live out their existence forever unhealed, for there is no
other remedy.
4. The Incurables
The Gorgias, however, is notable as a dialogue in which Socrates utterly fails
to convince his interlocutors, to the extent that he must even finish his elen-
chos of Callicles by speaking both parts, since Callicles refuses to continue
the contest. In the Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles both regard each other
as pathological cases, in need of radical treatment to correct the unhealthy
way in which they spend their lives. While Callicles warns Socrates to give
up his practice of skulking in the corners, playing at philosophy with a few
young boys, and to take up the place of a man, using rhetoric to win con-
tests in the assembly and the lawcourts, Socrates earnestly tries to convince
Callicles to submit his life to philosophic scrutiny and to give up the life of
the mob orator. Callicles’ refusal to take his medicine, however, marks him
as one of the incurables Socrates describes in the myth, who cannot benefit
from the treatment they get in the afterlife judgement, but can only serve as
an example to others. The elenchos cannot cure those who refuse to accept
the treatment and to adapt their lives to the conclusions of the argument,
but the spectacle of their suffering may nevertheless induce others reform
themselves.
The role of the incurable offenders in the Gorgias has been much debated,
for the very idea of punishing an incurable seems to fly in the face of the
rehabilitative idea of punishment that appears in the Platonic dialogues
from the Gorgias to the Laws.35 While there can be no doubt that Plato
takes the idea of the eternal punishment of certain exceptional figures like
35 Mackenzie and Saunders see the punishment of the incurables as a survival into
Plato’s penal theory of the retributive element of Greek penology, the idea that the divine
surrogates inflict retribution on those who did not pay the penalty in life (Mackenzie
[1981], 225–239 and Saunders [1991], 198, 206, particularly his discussion of the idea of
the surrogate, 52–61). While Mackenzie sees the retributive element as a flaw throughout
Plato’s penology, Saunders argues that Plato eliminates this aspect from his later works.
Contrast now, however, Brickhouse and Smith (1997 and 2002), who argue that the passages
that appear to advocate retributive punishments in fact make sense in terms of Socratic
intellectualist theories of punishment helping the wrongdoer become virtuous.
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Tantalus from a mythic tradition in which they have been used to represent
retribution, Plato himself has a use for them that does not include the
retributive element. The fate of the incurables in the afterlife illustrates, in
this life, the life of the unphilosophic who are powerful enough to evade
any kind of outside restraint (kolasis).36 Their inconsistent and irrational
lifestyle actually inflicts continuous suffering upon them, and their souls
are so deformed from the way they have lived that they can only continue,
in the afterlife, the kind of life they lived when alive. Although it does not
cure them, this punishment has a deterrent effect, serving as a warning to
those who are considering choosing the life of Callicles instead of the life
of Socrates.37 Even if Callicles refuses to change his life in consequence of
his public humiliation in the refutation, the silent audience of the dialogue,
the aspiring students of rhetoric who had come to hear Gorgias (and, of
course, the readers of Plato’s dialogue), may profit from the spectacle of his
suffering.38
36 Cf. Tht. 177a: οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁµοιοῦνται. ‘The penalty they pay
is the life they lead, answering to the pattern they resemble’.
37 Their deterrent value is not, as some have supposed, only for souls who are about to be
reborn into another mortal life, for the Gorgias makes no mention of the metempsychosis
that plays such an important role in Plato’s other eschatological myths. The incurables
serve as a deterrent to anyone who pays heed to the myth that Socrates tells, for like all
nekyias, it reveals the conditions of the underworld for ordinary mortals who have not,
like Odysseus, Heracles, or Theseus, ventured into the unseen realm. See Guthrie (1975),
IV, 306, who points out that revelations of the afterlife need not imply metempsychosis,
as Friedländer (1969 [1954]), i. 185 had argued. Friedländer was supported by Dodds, who
commented, ‘The passage only makes sense on the assumption that the dead will one day
return to earth: it presupposes the doctrine of rebirth, which Plato evidently already held
when he wrote the Gorgias but did not choose to expound in this context’ (Dodds [1959],
381). Such an assumption comes from the misguided attempt to find consistency between
the myths of Plato, as though they all expressed Plato’s own beliefs about the afterlife rather
than being used by him to express particular ideas in the different dialogues. As Long, in
the best treatment of metempsychosis in the Greek tradition, remarks, ‘there is no trace of
metempsychosis in the Gorgias any more than in the Apology’ (Long [1948], 65). Annas argues
that metempsychosis need not be implied for the punishment of the incurables to make
sense: ‘it is inappropriately literal-minded to press any further the question, what happens
to these curables who are cured. There is no answer within the myth in the form and to the
extent that Plato has developed it’ (Annas [1982], 124).
38 At the end of the dialogue, of course, Callicles shows every sign of disregarding the
admissions he has made in elenchos, of remaining uncured and incurable because he refuses
to take his medicine. Socrates, on the contrary, says that if he is defeated in the elenchos
and agrees with Callicles, but is found living contrary to his admissions, then he should be
considered a complete fool and worthy of nothing: καὶ ἐάν µε λάβῃς νῦν µέν σοι ὁµολογήσαντα,
ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ µὴ ταὐτὰ piράττοντα ἅpiερ ὡµολόγησα,piάνυ µε ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ µηκέτι
piοτέ µε νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, ὡς µηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα (488a6–b1).
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Plato uses the myth of the water-carriers, earlier in the dialogue, to
illustrate the sort of perpetual suffering that Callicles inflicts upon himself
by refusing to change his way of life, to show how Callicles’ choice of life,
far from being a life of action without restraint, is actually a life of suffering,
both on a personal and political level. Socrates signals the application of
the myth of afterlife to life in this world by his quotation of the famous
Euripides’ tag: ‘Who knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead
being alive?’ (492e10–11)39 While, on the literal level, the story conveys the
familiar traditional idea that those who are not initiated ‘carry water to this
leaky jar with another leaky thing, a sieve,’ Socrates builds an interpretation
into the tale (493b5–7).40 According to the clever man from whom he heard
the tale, the uninitiate (amuetoi) are the unintelligent (anoetoi), and the
jar (pithos) is the persuadable (pithanon) and impressionable (peistikon)
soul, which is leaky like the sieve.41 ‘In the foolish men that of the soul with
appetites, the foolish, intemperate, and insatiable in it, was a leaking jar,
because it couldn’t be filled’ (493a6–b3).42 Socrates goes on to develop this
idea of the soul as a jar which the intemperate man spends his whole life
trying to fill in vain, deriving pleasure from the process of filling but pain
from the endless emptying. On this level, the image obviously applies to
Callicles’ ideal of suffering no restraints on one’s appetite, but Plato also
39 τίς δ’ οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν µέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν, cf. Euripides’ Phrixus, fr. 833.
The tag is attributed either to the Phrixus or the Polyidos. Sextus Empiricus attributes the
same idea to Heraclitus (Pyrrh. Hyp. 3.230, see Heraclitus, fr. 62, 88). Cf. Dodds’ treatment of
the passage in the Gorgias, ad loc. Aristophanes repeatedly uses the line to great effect in the
Frogs (1082, 1477), finally turning it against Euripides when Dionysos abandons him in the
underworld and brings up Aeschylus instead.
40 φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρηµένον piίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρηµένῳ κοσκίνῳ.
41 Irwin translates piιθανόν as ‘persuadable’ and piειστικὸν as ‘impressionable,’ but, as
Dodds points out, both adjectives should have an active sense. If both are derived from
piειθω, the meaning would be some sense of ‘persuasive’. A similar phrase occurs just above,
attributed to some ‘wise man,’ τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐpiιθυµίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναpiείθε-
σθαι καὶ µεταpiίpiτειν ἄνω κάτω. ‘That of our soul with appetites is liable to be persuaded and to
sway up and down’. ᾽Αναpiείθεσθαι, however, is unequivocally passive in sense. Blank (1991),
26–27 points out that the confusion between the active and passive senses, persuadable and
persuasive, reflects the confusion of Callicles about the role of the orator, whether he is the
persuader of the masses or is constantly persuaded by the masses to different things. One
might speculate whether the words in question also carried the sense of piείσεσθαι derived
frompiάσχω, to suffer, playing on the pun betweenpiίθος,piεῖθω, andpiάθος. If the words carried
the resonance of suffering, as well as persuadable and persuasive, the connection between
Callicles’ confusion and the fate he will suffer, both in life and in the myth, would be neatly
drawn. But perhaps this word play would be too much, even for a κοµψὸς ἀνήρ.
42 piαράγων τῷ ὀνόµατι διὰ τὸ piιθανόν τε καὶ piειστικὸν ὠνόµασε piίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους
ἀµυήτους, τῶν δ’ ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐpiιθυµίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ
στεγανόν, ὡς τετρηµένος εἴη piίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀpiληστίαν ἀpiεικάσας.
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uses the image to describe the life of the orator trying to gratify the ever-
changing and unsatisfiable appetites of the persuadable masses, a task as
vain and tormenting as the labors of the water-carriers.43
The power to persuade the masses, Gorgias has claimed, ‘is responsible
for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time for rule over others in
his own city’ (452d6–8).44 Callicles urges Socrates to a life of public speaking
because learning how to please the crowd will enable him to save his life,
but Socrates objects that to be able to have power in a city requires one
to accommodate oneself to the rulers.45 For Plato, who could not accept
the idea of the ‘wisdom of the masses,’ the policy of an orator trying to
express the will of the people is nothing more than pandering, kolakeia.
Like the cook who strives to delight the palates of his diners regardless of
the effect on their health, the orator who stays popular by telling the people
what they want to hear is merely gratifying irrational appetites, a task that
is ultimately as fruitless as trying to fill a leaky pithos, for the masses will
43 Socrates opens his attack on both the personal and political position of Callicles with
his observation that Callicles is in love with two beloveds, Demos, son of Pyrilampes and the
Athenian demos (481c ff.). The choice of the homoerotic metaphor allows Socrates to point
out the confusion of the active and passive, ruler and ruled in Callicles’ ideal. Although the
adult male erastes like Callicles is the active pursuer, and the younger eromenos or paidika
like Demos is the more passive, pursued person in the ideology of this kind of Athenian
aristocratic homoerotic relationship, the beloved was also able to exercise a fair amount of
control over the lover, who would go to great lengths to win his beloved’s favour. Socrates
notes that however absurd the things their beloveds say may be, both he and Callicles are
helpless to contradict them (481d–482b). Although they are, in theory, the active partners in
the relationships, guiding the youths into manhood, they are both, in fact, helplessly subject
to their beloveds, the ruled instead of the rulers. The familiar paradox of the homoerotic
romance allows Plato to bring out the ambiguity of Callicles’ relation to the masses he desires
to dominate.
44 αἴτιον ἅµα µὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώpiοις, ἅµα δὲ τοῦ ἄ ων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ piόλει
ἑκάστῳ.
45 486b–c, 521a–d, 510a–e. Callicles here expresses the ideology found in Demosthenes
and other orators, that the orator reflects the ideas of the masses whom he is leading. Ober
(1989), 167 summarizes this ideology: ‘the worthy orator prefers the same things as the many,
and therefore, when speaking in public, he simply vocalizes the desires of the majority of
his listeners. Because the wisdom of the group is superior to that of the individual, the
desires of the majority are right desires, and the orator who voices these desires is therefore
advocating the right decision … The presumption that to agree with the masses was to be
in the right easily led to the implication that one’s opponent must be regarded as a traitor.
The savage tenor of Athenian political invective must be seen in the light of this progression’.
Demosthenes 18.20 is the most concise expression of this idea in the extant speeches: ‘but it
is not the speech of a rhetor, Aeschines, or the power of his voice which are his worth, but
it lies rather in his preference for the same things as the many and in his hating and loving
the same things as his homeland. Having such a disposition, everything a man says will be
patriotic’.
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never be satisfied.46 What Callicles thinks is ruling, both gratifying one’s own
appetites and gratifying the masses as an orator, is in fact being ruled, being
enslaved to the never-ceasing, ever-changing demands of an irrational,
contradictory mass. Callicles’ chosen mode of life, which he refuses to reject
even after his encounter with Socrates, this life amounts, in short, to nothing
more than the fate of the uninitiate in the underworld, the eternal vain
carrying of water in a sieve in the attempt to fill a leaky jar.
5. The Advantages of Myth
The myth of the water-carriers, like the myth of judgement at the end, serves
to amplify and clarify the arguments in the dialogue, not to present ideas
ungraspable by reason or to supplement a deficient argument with threats
of hell-fire hereafter. In the Gorgias, as in other of his dialogues, Plato takes
advantage of the nature of myth as a traditional tale by utilizing both the
traditional and narrative aspects. His myth plays with a variety of ideas and
motifs familiar from the mythic tradition, elements that would evoke for
his audience many other tales. The resonance of these traditional elements
permits Plato to convey complex ideas in compact form, without a large
amount of tedious explanation, since he need merely mention the name, for
example, of Aiakos to conjure up the associations of just behaviour, judging
disputes between the gods, and a special function in the realm of the dead.47
Not only does the general familiarity of these elements lend credibility to
Plato’s often radical ideas, but Plato sometimes invokes a specific myth
from the tradition that carries special authoritative force. He situates his
narrative of a shift from the judicial system of Kronos to that of Zeus with
46 When ill health results from the diet of flattering oratory, the city will blame the orators
who are currently dishing it up, not those who accustomed them to Sicilian banquets instead
of healthy regimens. Cf. Socrates’ warning to Callicles and prophecy (post eventum for Plato)
about the catastrophe of Alcibiades (519ab). The connection between Sicilian banquets and
the Sicilian disaster of 415 should not be overlooked.
47 Aiakos, as Pindar (Isthmian, 8.21) tells us, settled disputes among the gods, καί δαιµό-
νεσσι δίκας ἐpiείραινε. No tale of such judging survives, but Aiakos plays a privileged part in
interactions between the gods and men in a number of other stories, and later tradition gives
him the role of the doorkeeper of Hades. In many manuscripts of Aristophanes’ Frogs, the
doorkeeper is labelled Aiakos, but there is no evidence that Aristophanes’ audience would
have thought of him as such. Lucian (DMor. 6) and Apollodorus (3.12.6) make him the holder
of the keys to Hades. Isokrates relates that he was made a special servant of Hades and Perse-
phone as a reward for his virtue, just as Rhadamanthys becomes the servant of Kronos on the
Isles of the Blest in Pindar. (Isokrates 9.14; Pindar, Olympian II, 83 and Pythian II, 73, Cratinus,
Cheirones, 231 [i: 83 K], Plato, L. 948b, Plut. Theseus, 16b.)
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a reference to Homer’s tale of the division of the cosmos when Zeus took
power from Kronos (523a3–5). He also calls upon Homer to confirm his
assertion that only the most powerful will be punished eternally in the
afterlife (525d6–e2). Even his assignment of the expert in justice, Minos, as
judge in the afterlife, is backed up by a direct quotation from Homer (526c7–
d2). The support of the most authoritative voice in the tradition, whose
tellings are familiar to nearly all of Plato’s intended audience, shows that
Plato’s ideas fit within the framework of Greek culture, making them more
acceptable and persuasive to his audience even as he engages in shifting
their values and ideals.48
Plato also makes use of the features of myth as narrative to augment the
force of his ideas in the dialogue by employing the temporal sequence of
the narrative to bring out the relations between ideas. As scholars of myth
as far back as Plotinus have noted, one advantage of a mythic narrative is
that it can illustrate through chronological sequence the logical relations of
ideas.49 Plato depicts the relation between the Athenian lawcourt system
and the philosophical judgement of Socrates in terms of the shift from
the system of judgement in Kronos’ time to the system in Zeus’s time. By
separating them in time and portraying the system he prefers as the reform
of the other system, Plato builds his evaluation of the two systems into his
presentation of them and shows how the advantages of the later system
specifically compensate for the problems of the former system. The contrast
between the systems can be represented more clearly in narrative than in a
discussion because of the temporal sequencing of the narrative.
Plato also uses this feature of narrative to illustrate more clearly several
different aspects of the Socratic elenchos. In the myth, the stripping of the
soul so that it appears before the judge without any witnesses occurs before
the judge examines the soul of the deceased and before the deceased suf-
48 Allen (2000), 267 suggests that Plato’s reshaping of the traditional story serves as a
philosophic medicine for the audience (within and outside the dialogue). ‘Both the stories
about punishment and the decisions about punishment “cure” injustice in the soul by making
a statement about the proper way to think about desert and by teaching the wrongdoer
the “right” system of value. The storyteller who effects a resignification of a symbol that
encapsulates principles of authority and desert has the power to effect a cultural paradigm
shift and to change “the present order of things”. This is Hippocrates’ definition of what a
pharmakon does (Top. And. 45), and stories are medicine in this way’.
49 ∆εῖ δὲ τοὺς µύθους, εἴpiερ τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ µερίζειν χρόνοις ἅ λέγουσι, καὶ διαιρεῖν ἀpi’
ἀ ήλων piο ὰ τῶν ὄντων ὁµοῦ µὲν ὄντα, τάξει δὲ ἢ δυνάµεσι διεστῶτα (Ennead III, 5.24–27).
‘Myths, if they are really going to be myths, must divide out in time the things they relate and
separate from one another many realities which are together, but which stand apart in rank
or powers’ (text and translation from the Loeb edition).
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fers the corrective punishments. Each of these incidents, however, reflects
an aspect of the elenchos. The lack of witnesses corresponds to the elenctic
examination of a single person’s ideas, without the recourse to the opinions
of others or to long oratorical speeches. The examination of the naked soul
by the judge corresponds to the analysis of the person’s ideas and the point-
ing out of the inconsistencies. The suffering in the afterlife corresponds to
the shame of the elenchos, the effect of the defeat in this philosophic contest
which provokes the one who has undergone the elenchos to change his life.
Although Plato illustrates the process of elenchos in many of his dialogues
by depicting the interlocutors engaged in elenchos, the myth in the Gorgias
separates out these different aspects of the elenchos from one another, giv-
ing the reader a better understanding of the different effects of the Socratic
elenchos.
6. Plato’s Elenchos
The elenchos, then, does not merely point out the inconsistency in an inter-
locutor’s argument, diagnosing his problem. Rather, as the parallels with the
judgement and punishment in the myth suggest, the shameful defeat in the
elenchos also serves as a bitter purgative medicine that can transform the life
of the interlocutor, checking the inharmonious elements and correcting the
deformities of his soul. The Socratic elenchos humiliates its victim by show-
ing him to be a fool who does not know what he is talking about or how he
should live, but the pain of this experience can serve a positive function if
he abandons his former ideas and way of living. The elenchos has its lim-
its, however. Just as correction of injustice in this life can only be effective
if the guilty one is not able to escape punishment, the curative treatment
of the elenchos can only work if the victim takes his medicine and engages
in dialogue. If like Callicles he sulks and refuses to admit that he has been
defeated in the elenchos, then he will continue to inflict the sufferings of
the unphilosophic life upon himself. The spectacle of his humiliation and
sufferings, nevertheless, can serve to educate those who see it, just as the
punishment of the incurables in the afterlife acts as a deterrent to others.
Plato makes use of the narrative logic of the myth to clarify the presentation
of the philosophic mode of self-examination, supplementing the discussion
of the elenchos with the illustration in the myth.
The vivid images of the myth are perhaps the most memorable parts
of the whole dialogue. The picture of the naked soul of the Great King,
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covered with the festering sores of his unchecked injustices, who is facing
the stern judgement of Rhadamanthys, encapsulates a number of ideas in a
compact and memorable form. In this one image are crystallized the ideas
of the self made witness against itself, the damage that injustice does to the
wrongdoer, and the need for an expert in justice to replace the reliance on
the ‘wisdom of the masses’. In the Gorgias, Plato makes use of the mythic
tradition to condense his philosophic ideas into evocative images—whip
scars on the naked soul.
